Introduction

The Problem Domain
One of the challenges to investigating the feasibility and cost effectiveness of new software safety analysis techniques is developing a realistic model of a system that reflects the complexity of an actual product. The aviation domain provides several candidates and the avionics system of a typical regional jet aircraft was chosen because of its safety critical nature and its inherent complexity. As Figure 1 shows, the avionics architecture is comprised of many individual systems. Two key functions are the Flight Management System (FMS) and the Flight Control System (FCS). The FCS is, in turn, composed of a Flight Guidance System (FGS), Flight Director (FD), and Auto-Pilot (AP).
The FGS is a software function that generates roll and pitch values used to control the aircraft, and was selected as the example for our analysis. The FGS is decomposed into discrete and continuous elements called the mode logic and the flight control laws respectively. The flight control laws compare the measured state of the aircraft (position, speed, attitude, altitude,) to the desired state and generate guidance commands to minimize the difference between the two. The mode logic selects the appropriate flight control laws for use any time the system is active. The four functional areas of responsibility for the FGS are shown in Table 1 . The first FGS function, select and indicate flight guidance mode, is the responsibility of the mode logic. Although the choice of modes varies from aircraft to aircraft, a typical FGS will have roughly half a dozen lateral and vertical modes as shown in Table 2 . The second function, compute flight guidance steering commands, is performed by the flight control laws. The third and fourth functions, control the FD and AP, are a combination of software and hardware functionality and are not addressed in this analysis. The functional requirements for the FGS are the starting point for the safety analysis that will follow. 
Accident Model
Although thorough knowledge of the nature of accidents is not necessary in order to appreciate the value of our results, a high level understanding is helpful in order to see how this same approach could be applied in a larger context. Underlying our analysis is an assumption about the nature of accidents as shown in Figure 2 . The definitions used in this accident model are in general agreement with IEEE standards [ 1, 2] . 
Vertical Speed
As shown, errors -mistakes in requirements, design, or test -can be the root cause of an accident. These errors may arise anywhere in the design and development process. Ideally, all errors will be detected and corrected before the system is placed in operation. In reality, some errors will escape detection (and the corrective measures used to fix some others may actually introduce new errors). It is important to note that even if designed, manufactured, and tested to excruciating standards a perfectly functioning system may still contain logic errors if the requirements used to develop the system are incorrect. Regardless of the source, some of these errors may propagate to the next stage and be manifested during operation as faults. Fault tolerance design techniques may be used to contain the faults, but some faults may propagate to the next stage and result in system level failures -a loss of functionality. At this stage fail-safe design techniques may again halt the process, but some failures may not be contained and will place the system in a hazardous condition -a state that has the potential to result in an accident. The final factor that determines whether or not an accident occurs is the condition of the surrounding environment, (local terrain, other aircraft, atmospheric conditions,). A hazardous condition coupled with "good" environmental conditions may not result in an accident, and is only an incident. If "bad" conditions are present the result will be an accident. Thus, an error may be manifested as a fault, a fault may result in a failure, a failure may place the system in a hazardous condition, and a hazardous condition may result in an accident.
Our safety analysis therefore focuses on defining the hazards, failures, faults, and errors that could lead to accidents. As shown in later sections, our analysis will use a combination of standard techniques, (e.g., Fault Tree Analysis and Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis), in combination with non-traditional, yet very powerful, formal methods techniques.
Formal Methods Approach
of mathematical modeling techniques that are applicable to computer system (software and hardware) design. In much the same way that aeronautical engineers may make use of Theorem proving is a technique where both the system and its desired properties are expressed as formulas in mathematical logic. Proving a theorem is simply the process of verifying the existence of a mathematical property from the specifications of the system. Although in principle all proofs could be done manually, it is more effective to use machine based theorem provers to tackle larger, more realistic problems, such as the FGS mode logic.
Model checking is a technique that relies on building a finite model of a system and checking that a desired property holds in the model. Checking a model is the process of performing an exhaustive state space search, which is guaranteed to terminate if the model is finite, to look for examples that do not meet the property desired. If a counterexample is found, it is known that the property does not hold.
The use of formal methods in assessing software safety involves four steps as shown in Figure 3 . First, the software itself must be specified in a formal language. Second, the safety properties must also be defined formally. Third, both the specification and the safety properties must be translated into formal methods tools capable of performing the analysis. Finally, the analysis itself is conducted. An overview of each of these steps, as they have been applied to our problem domain, is provided in the next section. 
Specijjing the Requirements
A specification of the FGS mode logic has been generated in a formal language, the Requirements State Machine Language without Events (RSMLe). RSML-e is a synchronous language developed by Nancy Leveson's group at the University of California at Irving as a language for specifying the behavior of process control systems. One of the main design goals of RSML-" was readability and understandability by noncomputer professionals such as end-users, engineers in the application domain, managers, and representatives from regulatory agencies. RSML-' was used to specify the Traffic Collision Avoidance System I1 (TCAS-11) and the RSML'" model was ultimately adopted by the FAA as the official specification for TCAS-11.
RSML-e was heavily influenced by Statecharts and uses a similar notion of explicit event propagation. In the course of developing the TCAS-I1 specification, Levesonk group discovered that their most common source of errors was this dependence on explicit events. As its name implies, RSML-e eliminates the use of events. RSML-" is similar to SpecTRM-RL, developed by the Safeware Engineering Corporation, but has a slightly different syntax and underlying philosophy.
RSML-" runs in the "Nimbus" environment developed by the Critical Systems Research group at the University of Minnesota. The environment provides a framework for the development of software for safety critical systems, including simulation and visualization. In particular, the Nimbus environment includes a graphical user interface for the simulation engine. An advantage of RSML-" is that it is executable. That is, a user may provide inputs and watch how the state machines respond. This makes it ideal for use in a model based development environment where the requirements themselves can be verified early in the design and development process, while the cost of correcting them is still low. Another important advantage is that RSML-" possesses a precise formal semantics so that the models can be formally analyzed [5] . The general complexity of the RSML'" FGS model is illustrated in Table 3 . 
Defining the Safety Properties
The next step in the safety analysis process is to formally define those properties of the software associated with safety. Safety properties were generated via a Bi-Directional Analysis (BDA) technique [6, 7] . The starting point for the BDA is the list of hazards. Top-down analysis is then used to trace the hazards down to the related errors. To close the loop, an independent bottom-up analysis is then used to trace the errors back up to hazards.
Defining the Hazards
Safety is a system level problem and aviation safety standards ARP 4754 and ARP 4761 specify that safety analysis be performed both at the aircraft level and at the system level [S, 91. The aircraft level hazards are generally very few, such as loss of control. If the loss of control hazard is examined, it can be found that failures in a number of systems, (e.g., hydraulic lines, control yokes, flight control surfaces,), could give rise to it. However, as stated before, we are interested in defining the hazards for the FGS mode logic software. These hazards will derive from functional failures and are defined in a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA).
for the FGS, which were defined in Table 1 . Examining the consequences of the FGS failing to provide this functionality identified the hazards associated with the FGS. Each of these hazards was then assigned a level of criticality in accordance with DO-178B and MIL STD 882 [lo, 111. We identified ten Level D (Minor) hazards and four Level C (Major) hazards. Because Level C is the most critical hazard, the FGS is considered a Level C system. The FHA for the Level C hazards is shown in Table 4 . These hazards form the starting point for the next stage of the analysis.
We started with the functional requirements 
Top-Down Analysis Aircraft Manifestation
Gradual departure from references until detected by flight crew during check of primary flight data resulting in manual disconnect and manual flving.
Gradual departure from references until detected by flight crew during check of primary flight data resulting in manual disconnect and manual flying.
Incorrect "Pilot Flying" side indicated. Possible gradual departure fiom references until detected by flight crew during check of primary flight data resulting in manual disconnect and manual flying.
If engaged, engagement noticed by resistance to control column / wheel inputs. If disengaged, departure from references noticed during check of primary flight data. Result is manual disconnect and manual flying.
Comment
No Difference to the AP In an actual aircraft program, the FTA would start with the system level hazards, for example, Loss of Control, and include all aircraft systems that could potentially contribute to such a hazard. For our purposes, the FTA will start with the hazards identified in the FHA. For example, the FTA associated with the hazard "Incorrect Guidance" is shown in Figure 5 . Note that because such as the Flight Control Laws (FCL), and elements that the FGS outputs information to, such as the AP or FD. By performing a FTA on each of the four hazards listed in Table 4 , we obtained a listing of seventeen (1 7) possible events that could contribute to hazardous conditions. Of these, eight (8) were relevant to the FGS mode logic, Table 5 .
Bottom-Up Analysis
As a check of the results from the top-down FTA, we also conducted a bottom-up Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). FMECA is a feed-forward technique in that the starting points for the analysis are possible errors, which are then traced forward to see if they have any impact on system safety (i.e., if they lead to potential hazards) [2, 121. As with the FTA, the term FMECA should not imply that the results are limited to "failures". FMECA is a general analysis method that flows errors (or faults or failures) forward to hazardous conditions. Table 5 . Many of these errors are associated with hardware or are dependent on malfunctions in other systems and were considered out of scope for this software safety analysis. The FMECA for the four level C
13.C.1-5
Active FGS Sends Incorrect Guidance Values
Failure Mode Effects
Error in FGS-FCP Incorrect Mode Communications Logic Indication mode logic hazards is shown in Table 6 . Note that since all of these hazards are of the same criticality this column has been omitted.
In this instance, the FMECA did not uncover any new failures but rather confirmed the results generated by the FTA. This is one of the advantages of BDA, tracing through the accident process in both directions gives higher confidence in the final results.
Analysis
Flight crew unable to determine mode and state of flight guidance resulting in manual disconnect and manual flying. 
Safety Properties
The eight categories of software errors that are in scope were further examined, in order to identify the specific properties of the software that could produce the higher level events. For example, the properties associated with "Error in FGS-FCP Communications Logic" are shown in Table 7 .
Note that many of these "safety" properties look like functional requirements. In this sense, we have identified those requirements that are directly related to safety. Verifying that these design requirements are indeed artifacts of the system we have constructed is an important step -one that is often omitted because it is so difficult. As shown in Table 8 , the complete analysis identified 142 distinct safety properties that, if violated, could result in one of the four Level C (Major) hazards identified in Table 4 . Note that an error in the "active / inactive side" logic could generate each of the four hazardous conditions.
Translating the Requirements Model and Safety Properties into Analysis Tools
to ensure that the requirements model and safety
The third step in the safety analysis process is 0 VS switch lamps shall be lit when VS mode is active. VS switch lamps shall not be lit when VS mode is cleared. language. It is certainly possible to define the requirements and safety properties in the same language initially, but for real projects this will rarely be the case. The requirements model will probably be developed in tools such as RSML-' or Matlab. Safety properties will probably be defined in English prose. Even if the properties were defined in the requirements modeling tool, the modeling tool itself would probably lack the analysis capability and would require translation to a theorem Drover or model checker to enable Step 4. As part of this project, the University of Minnesota has automated the translation of the model from RSML-' to the SMV model checker and the PVS theorem prover. Building the translation capability is possible since both the origin and destination languages have a well defined semantics. S M V model checker language was done manually. As a check on the accuracy of the translation, two experienced investigators translated each property independently and then compared results. The translation is straightforward, but requires some knowledge of temporal logic. If not already transparent, doing the manual translation also serves as a check on how well the properties (functional or safety) are defined. Ambiguous requirements result in ambiguous properties that cannot be stated in the precise manner demanded by a formal language. SPEC refers to the fact that this is a property being specified, AG means to do the proof for "All Global" states, HDG-Lamp is the variable used to determine if the HDG Lamp is on, and Is-HDG-Active is the Boolean state variable used to determine if the HDG mode is active. This S M V statement would be literally translated as: 
Conducting the Analysis
converted to the same language, performing the analysis is simply a matter of running the formal methods tool. In order to leverage the lessons learned from simple models on more complicated ones, we created scaled down versions of the FGS mode logic so that our analysis could proceed in an incremental fashion. To date, we have verified the presence of all properties associated with all incremental models, and we anticipate completing the final analysis of the full model by the end of the year, Table 9 . 
Summary and Conclusions
We have constructed a formal, executable model of a complex, embedded software systemthe mode logic of a Flight Guidance System. Having the ability to execute the model in real time helps to verify the correctness and completeness of the requirements and is also a starting point for further model based development. In order to identify the properties of the software that are related to safety, we then conducted a thorough software safety analysis using standard techniques such as Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). In order to verify that the model did indeed contain the safety properties required, we then conducted an extended software safety analysis on the design requirements using formal methods techniques. In particular, we have used a model checker to show that all of the safety properties are mathematically verifiable properties of the model. modeling, in conjunction with Bi-Directional Analysis and formal methods analysis techniques, to be a cost-effective and flexible approach to the issue of software safety. In particular, we were impressed with the power of model checking as applied to this example. This lends credence to the belief that such approaches may become an integral part of future model based development efforts [ 131.
